Petrick

Adverse Selection and Moral Haz Petrick German edition

Essay aus dem Jahr 2005 im Fachbereich BWL - Recht, Note: 1,7, Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia, Sprache: Deutsch, Anmerkungen: Legal and economical interpretations of contract, contract law and contract theory, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Paper explains negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard for the case of transaction costs and incomplete contracts and describes incentives to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, such as signaling and deductibles as well as indemnity contracts and valued contracts. , Abstract: Legal and economical interpretations of contract, contract law and contract theory, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Paper explains negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard for the case of transaction costs and incomplete contracts and describes incentives to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, such as signaling and deductibles as well as indemnity contracts and valued contracts.